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Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Challenges and the Road Ahead
by Va n e s s a J . Ji m é n e z
tion of Iraq as an Islamic state, the subordination of various individual rights to the principles of Islam, and the determination of
personal status matters in accordance with religious jurisprudence.
There were also requests that certain exalted status and recognition
be given to the Marja’iya (Islamic religious authority).
In the final draft Iraq is not described as an Islamic state, but
Islam is affirmed as “the official religion of the State” and recognized as “a fundamental source of legislation” (art. 2). The latter reference represents a compromise between those who wanted Islam to
be a source of law and those who wanted the more expansive application of Islam as the source of legislation. The Constitution also
mandates that no law may contradict “the established provisions of
Islam” (art. 2), and that the judges on the Federal Supreme Court
must include “experts in Islamic jurisprudence” (art. 89).4
Tempering the possibility that these provisions could be used
by a non-secular Shiite- dominated legislature or judiciary to discriminate against religious minorities, the Constitution guarantees
to all individuals “the full religious rights . . . to freedom of religious belief and practice” (art. 2) and “freedom of thought, conscience and faith” (art. 40). It also prohibits discrimination based
on “religion, creed, belief or opinion” (art. 14) and affirms “freedom of worship” (art. 41).5

O

N OCTOBER 15, 2005, the Iraqi people went forward
with a referendum that demonstrated their substantial support for a new Constitution.1 The success of the referendum means that the Iraqi government must now face
the issue of how to implement the document. Many believe the new
Constitution can stave off an all-out civil war by laying a framework
to resolve some of the most contentious issues in Iraq, including territory, power, the role of religion, and resource allocation. Others
fear the Constitution will be another source of sectarian and ethnic
violence and will facilitate the disintegration of the Iraqi state.
An evaluation of the Constitution’s value as a tool for conflict
management is complex. The Constitution represents a delicate
balance between Iraq’s democratic future and the Islamic heritage
celebrated by most Iraqis, as well as a fragile accord between an
emerging national unity and an entrenched history of ethnic and
sectarian loyalties. Many hoped the Constitution would embody a
political compact among Iraq’s three principal groups: the Shiites,
Kurds, and Sunnis. Unfortunately, although last minute amendments and concessions by the parties moved Iraq closer to this
objective,2 the groups were unable to achieve a full consensus and
Sunni Arab opposition to the Constitution remains significant.
Despite its omissions and flaws, the resulting Constitution
provides a legal framework that is largely consistent with international state practice for constitution drafting and progressive for
the region in most respects. It also provides an underlying framework for the creation and maintenance of a unified, democratic,
and pluralistic Iraq in which the rule of law and the equality of all
people is respected. Iraq must still take a number of steps, however, before this constitutional mandate can be fully realized. The
draft contains significant ambiguity, and the framers postponed a
number of critical decisions,3 which future legislation must
address. If the political will exists within Iraq, the Constitution can
be implemented, interpreted, enforced, and even amended to realize this mandate. Such a process could help prevent the
Islamization of the state, the marginalization of minorities, the
feared disparities between regions and provinces, and the dissolution of Iraq. The Constitution’s value will therefore depend largely
on who interprets its provisions and ensures its implementation, as
well as how this implementation is carried out. The issues outlined
below will merit special attention.

“The Constitution represents
a delicate balance between
Iraq’s democratic future and
the Islamic heritage celebrated
by most Iraqis ...”
Article 2, also known as the “repugnancy clause,” further evidences the drafters’ efforts to find some synthesis of and balance
between Islam and democracy. This clause provides that no law
may be enacted that “contradicts the established provisions of
Islam,” but also declares, with equal weight, that no law can be
enacted that contradicts the “principles of democracy” or the
“rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this constitution.”
Although some will try, it would be inappropriate to narrowly
interpret the clause to promote the greater Islamization of Iraq. In
fact, the reference to “established provisions of Islam” should further
limit this possibility. Given the diversity in Islamic beliefs and
practices and the lack of agreement as to what tenets and rules of
Islam are fixed, the application of Islamic principles and values is
difficult. This clause therefore provides an overriding framework
that permits respect for Islam and a simultaneous commitment to
the rule of law, human rights, and democracy.
A final critical factor in determining Islam’s impact on Iraq,
as well as the rights of minorities and women, concerns who has

ISLAM AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION
The international community expected that Islam would be
represented in some way in Iraq’s new constitution. The legitimacy of the document will be measured, in part, by the manner in
which it reflects the history, values, and traditions of the Iraqi people. Early drafts of the Constitution generated speculation as to
how the representation of Islam would emerge. There were calls for
express references to sharia law (Islamic religious law), the descripVanessa Jiménez is an alumnus of the American University Washington College of Law.
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HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS
The Constitution’s human rights provisions evolved significantly over time. The final draft expressly affirms a number of
rights and freedoms (Section Two) and confirms a “respect for
international obligations” (art. 8). Given the perception among
some Iraqis that international instruments reflect only Western
values, many were surprised by the inclusion of then-Article 44 in
the first draft constitution, released on August 28, 2005. This article provided that “[a]ll individuals shall have the right to enjoy all
the rights mentioned in the international treaties and agreements
concerned with human rights that Iraq has ratified and that do
not contradict with the principles and provisions of this constitution.” Although this provision was removed in last-minute negotiations, the elimination has no technical legal significance
because Iraq’s obligations under international law exist independently of any affirmations in the Constitution. These obligations
are also already affirmed in Article 8, albeit not as explicitly as
some would have preferred. Nevertheless, Article 44 provided a
more express confirmation of Iraq’s commitments to international law and human rights — a commitment that could have helped
secure fundamental freedoms within Iraq’s new legal and political
framework. On the other hand, Article 44 could have been interpreted in an adverse way that subordinated Iraq’s obligations
under international human rights law to its domestic legislation
and the principles of Islam.
As noted above, Section Two of the Constitution lists a number of political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights.8 Under
the Constitution some of these rights and freedoms will be “regulated by law.” This is not an uncommon formulation, as such regulation allows the legislature to further formulate enabling legislation to make these rights effective. This language raises concerns,

however, because authoritarian regimes have used this formula to
place significant limits on rights and freedoms. For instance,
Article 36 affirms that the state, as regulated by law, will guarantee
freedom of expression, press, assembly, and peaceable demonstration such that it does “not disturb public order and morality.”
Some believe this may result in the imposition of unreasonable
restrictions, particularly given the potentially broad application of
“morality” in a country divided along ethnic and sectarian lines.
This fear is further heightened by the region’s experience with
Islamic morality police, i.e., government authorities tasked with
enforcing social mores.
Article 44 of the current Constitution could be interpreted as
mitigating this possibility because it provides that “[t]here may not
be a restriction or limit on the practice of any rights or liberties stipulated in this constitution, except by law or on the basis of it, and
insofar as that limitation or restriction does not violate the essence
of the right or freedom.” While international law does permit the
limitation of non-derogable rights under certain circumstances,
Article 44 can be read to guard against the imposition of arbitrary
restrictions and overbroad, unreasonable, or illegal limitations.9
Lastly, the Constitution does not offer significant detail about
the institutions that will protect, promote, and enforce human
rights. Article 99 provides for an “independent” High Commission
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the authority to interpret relevant constitutional provisions.
Although Article 90 vests the Federal Supreme Court with this
authority, the Constitution includes very little about the composition and operating framework of this constitutional court. It does
provide that “the Court shall be made up of a number of judges,
experts in Islamic Jurisprudence, and law experts” (art. 89). This
Article can be problematic, however, if it is interpreted to authorize the appointment of judges that have no civil law training and
only expertise in sharia and other Islamic jurisprudence. This
interpretation would be inconsistent with international state practice, which generally requires that “[p]ersons selected for judicial
office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate
training or qualifications in law.”6 An interpretation and implementation that does not require civil law training for judges to the
constitutional court would diminish the integrity of the judiciary
by undermining the equality and due process rights otherwise
guaranteed by the text.7
Other constitutional provisions could further prevent the
appointment of judges with no civil law training. For example, the
Constitution provides that the members of the Court, their mode
of appointment, and the Court’s method of work will be “determined by a law enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members
of the Council of Representatives” (art. 89). This requisite supermajority, particularly given the more secular tendencies of the
Kurds, the Sunnis, and a notable portion of Shiite leaders, increases the likelihood that the Court will be representative of Iraqi society, not dominated by clerics, and composed solely of individuals
with civil law training.

Iraqis participate in Constitution voting.

for Human Rights and states that its functions will be regulated by
law and subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives.
The text does not, however, specify the scope, competencies, or
composition of the institution. To their credit, during constitutional negotiations several Iraqi legislators expressed great interest
in such a Commission.10 These details must be revisited when the
government considers amendments and implementing legislation.

MINORITY RIGHTS
Iraq’s minorities and their specific vulnerabilities shift according to the particular issue being considered. For instance, on matters of religious significance, there is a minority Christian population (about 5 percent) and a minority Sunni Muslim population
(about 25-30 percent) living in a predominantly Shiite Muslim
country (approximately 65-80 percent). On issues where ethnic
identities still tend to drive decision making, there is a significant
non-Arab minority of Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and
others residing in a country that is approximately 80 percent Arab.
Consequently, the ability of Iraqi leaders to forge a peaceful future
will depend on the manner in which the government ensures that
22
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nance that they desire, while Sunnis Arabs could be assured their
fair share of the national wealth and form autonomous regions
should they choose to do so.
Nevertheless, some argue that this federal structure will merely solidify the division of Iraq into three separate entities — a
Kurdish North, Shiite South, and a Sunni entity in the West and
extended center. They claim that the negotiators’ failure to create a
structure that defines federal units by territory rather than ethnic
or sectarian characteristics, will lead to Iraq’s dissolution. There is
some merit to this argument. Consequently, the legislation drafted
by Iraq’s new parliament and the initial rulings of the constitutional court will be central in the resolution of this issue. For example,
under the Constitution the next legislature has six months to
establish the details surrounding the procedures for the formation
of new regions (arts. 113-115). This same legislature must agree on
detailed revenue allocation formulas and the full manner in which
the respective governments will jointly manage and control both
developed and unexplored oil and gas resources. If the legislature
fails to strike a balance between the country’s have and have-nots,
and national responsibilities are not considered alongside local allegiances, a stable federal structure will remain elusive.
Finally, democracy in Iraq must encompass more than free
elections to protect the rights of minorities. Sunnis, Kurds, and
smaller minority groups must also be guaranteed effective participation in governance through representation in the bicameral legislature and the many committees, agencies, and institutions of the
state. With respect to the Iraqi legislature, the Constitution only
provides that there shall be “representation of all components of
the people” in the Council of Representatives (art. 47), and that
the Federation Council will include “representatives from the
regions and the governorates that are not organized in a region”
(art. 62). The Constitution gives no guidance as to how this representation will be achieved, and there are virtually no details regarding a federal election law.
Despite this omission, the Transitional Government adopted
a draft electoral law in mid-September 2005. 12 The elections for
the Council of Representatives will be carried out on the basis of
proportional representation, which is likely to ensure a fair representation of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Many have raised doubts,
however, regarding smaller minorities’ capabilities for independent
election to the Council. The Council has no reserved seats for the
smaller minority groups, and there is no requirement that candidates from these minority groups be included on party lists.13

the unique identities, values, and concerns of its diverse ethnic, religious, and national minorities are respected and given a voice in the
governance of the country. The Constitution’s framers dealt with
this objective principally through the recognition of freedom of religion, the protection of various minority rights, and the establishment of a loose federal structure that emphasizes local self-governance and the equitable distribution of natural resource revenues.
In addition to the provisions relating to freedom of religion,
the Constitution provides a number of protections for the rights of
minorities. For instance, the text acknowledges that Iraq is “a
country of many nationalities, religions and sects” (art. 3), recognizes the Arabic and Kurdish languages as official languages of
Iraq, provides for the recognition of other languages in areas densely populated by minorities, and affirms the right of “Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkomen,
Syriac, and Armenian” (art. 4). The Constitution also states that all
Iraqis shall be equal before the law and free from discrimination
based on “race, ethnicity, origin, color, religion, creed, [or] belief ”
(art. 14), and it “guarantees the administrative, political, cultural,
educational rights for the various nationalities, such as Turkmen,
Caldeans, Assyrians and all other components” (art. 121). This last
provision is broad and, if properly implemented in the context of
Iraq’s existing obligations under international law, can further protect the rights of racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities..
The Constitution also establishes a loose federal structure that
strives to devolve power to local populations as a means of managing Iraq’s diversity while addressing the distinct needs of minority
groups. This local self-governance also ensures minorities a greater
opportunity to influence those decisions that will most affect their
political, economic, social, and cultural development. Specifically,
the Constitution defines two sub-national levels of governance —
regions and governorates not organized in a region. The federal
government retains exclusive power over matters such as foreign
relations, national security, and monetary policy, but shares power
with the regions over matters such as education and health. The
regions may exercise powers that are not exclusively held by the federal government, and governorates that are not organized into
regions are granted “broad administrative and financial authorities”
and may receive additional delegated powers from the central government. Currently, Kurdistan is the only region that exists in Iraq
and it retains the autonomous powers it has exercised since 1992.
The Constitution does allow, however, that any of Iraq’s 18 governorates may also, alone or with other governorates, establish themselves as regions and assume commensurate powers.11
This federal structure can only succeed if each governorate
and region has sufficient resources. There are a number of mechanisms in the Constitution to ensure no population or geographic
area is denied the benefits of the country’s natural resource wealth.
Under Articles 108 and 109, “[o]il and gas are owned by all the
people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.” The federal
government, in cooperation with the oil producing governorates
and regions, is charged with managing oil and gas extracted from
current fields, provided that it allocates the wealth “in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the
country.” Regions and governorates are entitled to “an equitable
share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge its responsibilities and duties . . . having regard to its resources, needs and the
percentage of its population” (art. 117). If properly implemented
and interpreted, these provisions could reduce secessionist tendencies, and would allow Kurds and Shiites to exercise the self-gover-

WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Although most negotiators did not make women’s rights a
priority, the issue was extremely important during negotiations.
The Constitution, which addressed this issue in some detail,
ensures that all Iraqis “are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender” (art. 14); guarantees that both male and
female citizens have equal rights “to participate in public affairs
and to enjoy political rights” (art. 20); prohibits domestic violence
(art. 29); and provides for an electoral law that aims to achieve not
less than 25 percent representation of women in the Council of
Representatives (art. 47).14
Although these and other provisions provide a substantial
foundation for the advancement of women’s rights and a strong
argument against their limitation, one provision remains particularly controversial. Article 39 states that “Iraqis are free in their
commitment to their personal status according to their religions,
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sects, beliefs, or choices. This shall be regulated by law.” There is
legitimate concern that this provision will diminish the rights previously enjoyed by women in Iraq. Specifically, many fear it will
lead to the abolition of Iraq’s 1959 Law of Personal Status, which
grants uniform rights to a husband and wife to divorce, receive
inheritance, and governs related issues such as child support.
Although some argue that Article 39 protects women by providing
Iraqis with a choice to adjudicate family matters in a civil or religious court, others contend that given the seriousness of this issue
and its repercussions for Iraqi women the provision is too vague
and therefore dangerous. Consequently, many have recommended
amendments to the article or enabling legislation that provides for
the full and informed consent of both parties to submit cases to
religious courts, review of rulings from religious courts by the civil
courts, and clarification that civil law is the default legal system for
personal status matters.
Some believe the current federal system will allow regions,
and perhaps governorates, to enact legislation that violates
women’s rights while remaining immune from censure by the central government or the Federal Supreme Court. Proponents of this
argument point to the diminished powers of the central government and to Article 117(2), which provides that if a “contradiction” exists between regional and national legislation the region
may amend the national legislation as long as the subject matter is
not within the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Although local attempts to restrict women’s rights are likely to
occur, the Constitution provides for quite the opposite because it
clearly establishes its own supremacy, including its protections for
the rights of women. The text also prohibits regional constitutions
and laws that contradict the federal Constitution, ensures that no
law in Iraq can contradict the principles of democracy and human

rights, and grants the Federal Supreme Court the authority to
review the constitutionality of federal, regional, and governorate
laws.15 Although enhanced autonomy and self-governance provide
for greater diversity and accommodate differing values and aspirations, neither is a license to abuse rights and freedoms.
As with the other issues discussed above, this debate will be
settled through the implementation, interpretation, enforcement,
and possible amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution
can thus be an instrument for positive change, positioning Iraq as
a leader in the region in advancing women’s rights. This will
depend, however, on a legislature with an active political will and
a public that holds its representatives accountable.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STEPS
Iraq’s Constitution is not a perfect document. If interpreted
and implemented wisely, however, it could provide a new vision and
a sound framework for a unified, democratic and pluralistic Iraq
that respects the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of all. The
public referendum that ushered in the new Constitution also paved
the way for the election of a permanent legislature on December 15,
2005. This body will interpret, implement, and possibly amend the
Constitution. The manner in which the candidates and their parties campaign for this national election will provide a forecast of
how the subsequent legislature will accomplish its mandate. If parties attempt to reach across ethnic and sectarian lines, it is likely that
the Constitution will be used to help manage conflict and prevent
civil war. If, however, the December elections serve to further
entrench divisions and marginalize citizens from the political
process, a stable and peaceful Iraq will remain elusive. In the end,
HRB
the fate of the Iraqi people rests in their own hands.
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